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1:'
Descriptions of the gold standard have stressed two very different as
pects of that monetary system. Modern observers, concerned with high and
rising rates of inflation, have written enthusiastically, and often nostal
gically, of the longer-term price stability that existed during the gold-
standard era. Many other economists during the past century and a half,
however, have rendered a less kindly judgment, emphasizing instead the fre
quent and sometimes severe business contractions that characterized the period
as well as the substantial shorter and intermediate-term swings in the price
level.
Irving Fisher (1920, p . 65), for instance, phrased his criticism thus:
"The chief indictn«nt, then of our present [gold] dollar is that it
is uncertain. As long as it is used as measuring stick, every
contract is necessarily a lottery; and every contracting party is
compelled to be a gambler in gold without his own consent. ... One
of the results of such uncertainty is that price fluctuations cause
alternative fluctuations in business; that is, booms and crises,
followed by contractions and depressions."
The objective of this paper is to investigate the incidence of cyclical
fluctuations within countries adhering to the gold standard and the
transmission of these fluctuations among countries. In investigating these
topics we first review each of the important cyclical contractions in the
United Kingdom and United States during the century 1833-1933. We then pre
sent the results of more formal tests of hypotheses about the causes of such
contractions and their dissemination across countries. The basis of these
tests is a vector autoregressive model estimated for both countries for the
coirfained subperiods 1837-1859 and 1882-1914.
The main objective of the historical narrative is to see whether a mone
tary explanation of the business cycle is at least broadly consistent with.the
data for the two countries. To do so we analyze the movements in the U.K« and
U.S. money and gold stocks, the apparent causes of those movements, and their
relationships to one another and to output over the cycle.
In the course of this analysis, we track over territory touched upon to
varying degrees by a number of other authors. Insofar as possible, we have
tried to integrate their accounts with ours. Our analysis, however, differs
from most of these earlier analyses both in its breadth of coverage, spanning
both the United Kingdom and the United States and a century of data, and in
its emphasis, being concerned almost exclusively with cyclical fluctuations
and with monetary, as opposed to, credit or interest-rate data.
The vector autoregressive model and associated hypothesis tests are
direct complements of the historical narrative. They enable us to evaluate in
a more rigorous fashion the apparent relationships uncovered by the simpler
historical approach. Again our chief concerns are the association of monetary
shocks and cyclical declines in output within each of the two countries and
the strength of possible alternative channels of transmission between the two
countries. The latter include specie flows, price and interest-rate arbi
trage, asset-market adjustments, and direct absorption effects.
Since the historical and econometric sections contain separate summaries
of results and the last section of the paper an overall summary, we will skip
a detailed synopsis at this juncture. Instead, we merely'mention'the two
principal findings: that monetary shocks were the main source of cyclical
fluctuations during this period and that the monetary system itself the gold
standard—was the main mechanism through which the shocks and associated
fluctuations in output were disseminated.
1. Historical Overviev
At the start of our sample period, the United Kingdom was a large coun
try, London the main financial center of the would, and the Bank of England a
central figure in international monetary activity. The United States, in
contrast, started the period as a significantly smaller economy. During most
of the 19th and early 20th centuries, however, the United States grew rapidly.
Immigration rates were high, except for Civil War and major economic depres
sion years, and the frontier moved steadily westward. By 1914, as a result,
the U.S. net national product was about three times that of the United Kingdom
versus roughly three-quarters that of the United Kingdom in 1834.
In the 18th century, the United Kingdom and most other countries had been
on a bimetallic standard, primarily gold and silver. The United Kingdom re
stored specie payments in 1821 after the Napoleonic Wars and remained on the
gold standard continuously through 1914. Then in 1915, with the economic and
financial disruptions of World War I, the United Kingdom left the gold stan
dard and in its stead adopted a managed fiduciary standard that lasted until
the middle of the next decade. The United Kingdom returned briefly to gold in
1925, this time a gold exchange standard, but that system was short lived. In
1931, faced with the massive balance of payments deficits engendered by the
deflation then underway in the United States, the United Kingdom left gold for
good.
The United States came to the gold standard later than the United Kingdom
(1834), but stayed on it two years longer. Like the United Kingdom, it too
had a temporary break with gold, the U.S. episode beginning in 1862 after the
start of the Civil War and lasting de facto until 1879, de jure until 1900.
Gold during those years remained an official currency along with the
greenbacks issued to finance the war. The United States was in effect on a
dual moneCary standard with the price of one currency, greenbacks, in terms of
another, gold, det'errained by the market. And since gold remained the inter
national currency, flexible exchange rates prevailed between the United States
and the rest of the world. Only after the United States deflated its price
level did convertibility of the dollar with gold at the pre-Civil War parity
become possible.
The international gold standard that the United States and United Kingdom
participated in during the period 1834-1914 was a mixed rather than a pure
gold standard. Under Che latter, the only money is gold coins or notes backed
by 100 percent gold reserves and gold is transferred between countries to meet
balance of payments obligations. The modified gold standard of 1834-1914,
however, had many of the features of a fiat currency system, domestic central
bank operations, international reserve currencies, and domestic fiduciary
monies that functioned as substitutes for gold coins. Nonetheless, the mone
tary systems were operational gold standards whether pure or not.
Under the modified gold standard, central banks engaged in open-market
operations of buying and selling domestic securities. Some, like the Bank of
England, reputedly "played by the rules of the game," permitting the domestic
money supply to adjust in the direction required for long-run international
economic equilibrium.^ Other central banks, though, frequently followed temporary
policies of sterilizing gold flows, buying or selling domestic securities and,
hence, changing the domestic credit component of the money supply to offset
the monetary effects of such flows in the short run. Over the longer run,
however, the ability to intervene was necessarily limited unless, of course,
as often happened in time of war, a country left gold and thereby let its
exchange rate float.
Under this system, the Bank of England maintained its reserves in gold
but most other countries held their reserves in gold and sterling assets.
Thus, balance-of-payments adjustments could be made by transferring currencies
and titles to securities and gold in financial centers rather than by shipping
gold per se. Given that London was the world financial center and that
sterling was a reserve asset, the Bank of England could have a significant
effect on money supplies abroad via its open market operations and manipulations
of Bank rate.
2 Theoretical Considerations
As an empirical proposition, the link between money and business fluctua
tions has long been know to exist. Well before our own era, monetary econo
mists such as David Hume, Henry Thornton, and Irving Fisher, took this associ
ation as a datum, second in importance perhaps only to that between money and
the price level. These writers, moreover, seem to have been well aware of the
apparent contradiction between the two relationships. One of the questions
they, like modern economists, sought to answer was how changes in the stock of
money, a nominal variable, could in the long run affect only the price level,
another nominal variable, but in the short run affect output and employment,
real variables.
The distinction made by Fisher, for one, to rationalize these seemingly
anomalous effects, was between the expected and unexpected effects of monetary
changes: unexpected changes giving rise to "money illusion" and thereby
impinging upon output and employment. In the past two decades, Milton
Friedman (e.g., 1968) has used a similar line of reasoning. Output in this
view will fall below its permanent level or unemployment rise above the
natural rate as a consequence of some economic agents' inability to see
through monetarily induced expenditure and price changes to their ultimate
source. In the empirical implementation of this model, a sudden change in the
nominal stock of money or in the price level (or in their rates of change) is,
therefore, the causative variable.^
Over the past decade, this approach has been extended and otherwise
recast by proponents of the rational-expectations hypothesis. In these models,
economic agents as a general proposition are posited to take account of more
than simply the past behavior of money or the price level in forming their
expectations. They are assumed instead to know the structure of the relevant
economic relationships and to make unbiased forecasts of the relevant economic
variables. In empirical applications of this rational-expectations approach,
output or unemployment depends upon deviations in money (or other variables)
from the values individuals predict on the basis of that knowledge.
Until very recently, models of this sort, with their emphasis upon
expectations and dynamic adjustment were almost exclusively applied to closed
economies. The standard models of open economies and international adjustment
that dealt with behavior of output were all in the Meade-Mundell tradition.
They were static rather than dynamic and devoid of any distinction between
actual and anticipated values.^
In the past several years, however, the two strains of the literature
have begun to merge. Michael Darby and Alan Stockman (1983) have estimated a
simultaneous model for the United States and seven other industrialized
countries during the Bretton-Woods era that- is consistent with a natural-rate
rational—expectations approach. And Nasser Saidi, in two separate theoretical
papers (1980, 1982) has applied a rational expectations model to questions of
international transmission under both floating and fixed-exchange rate re
gimes.
Underlying our empirical analyses of U.S. and U.K. business cycles under
the gold standard,- is a set of maintained hypotheses of a similar sort. For
each country the proximate determinant of output fluctuations were sudden,
unanticipated changes in domestic monetary variables. Transmission between
countries occurred mainly via specie flows and the monetary reactions they
induced, either on the part of the monetary authorities or on the part of the
banking system.
An unanticipated decrease in monetary growth in the United Kingdom, for
example, initially reduced output growth in the United Kingdom, raised (real)
interest rates, produced downward pressure on the rate of rise of prices and
induced a balance of payments surplus and hence inflows of specie and of
capital from the United States. Monetary growth in the United States de
creased as a result of the specie outflow, the real rate of interest rose, and
output growth and the rate of rise of prices fell. After the shocks worked
their way through both economies, output in each returned to a level con
sistent with its permanent rate of growth, real interest rates to their
initial levels and the nominal stocks of money to levels consistent with
worldwide monetary equilibrium.
Part of the adjustment to the Initial monetary deceleration could also
have occurred via price and interest rate arbitrage. Whether the former in
turn had a depressing influence on output would depend, however, upon the
underlying model. If price shocks rather than monetary shocks affected
aggregate supply, then price arbitrage would be a channel through which
monetary disturbances in one country could have real effects in another.^
The alternative view is that cyclical fluctuations in the two countries
resulted from some common real shock. According to this explanation,
contractions in the money stock were an effect rather than the cause of the
declines in income. Declines in American and British real output due, say, to
decreased demands 'for their exports on the part of other nations led to
deficits in the balance of payments, gold outflows and declines in the nominal
stocks of money in the two countries.
The role of financial panics—an integral part of the history of the
period—also differs according to the two sets of hypotheses. Under the
first, it was purely monetary. Panics were shocks largely if not completed
unrelated to prior income movements. They affected output only via their
impact on the nominal stock of money. Under the second, the reverse held.
Panics resulted from prior declines in income or one of its components and
were a method by which the requisite reduction in the nominal stock of money
was produced.^
In pure form, the two sets of hypotheses are, therefore, competing. In
actuality, one can easily envision a more complex situation, feedback from
income to money, or vice versa, also being of some importance in the one or
the other case.
3 Historical Evidence on the Cyclical Behavior of Money and Output
The National Bureau of Economic Research's chronology of reference cycles
sef^ves as a convenient point of departure for discussion the cyclical contractions
in the two countries. For the United States, this chronology begins in 1834,
the start of our sample period; for the United Kingdom actually Great
Britain—it begins 43 years earlier. Table 1 lists the calendar-year reference
cycle dates for the two countries, starting'with 1836, the peak in both countries
for the first full contraction encompassed by our data, and ending with the
Great Depression of the 1930s. In the United Kingdom over this period there
were 19 reference-cycle contractions. In the United States there were either
25 or 23 depending upon how we treat the contractions of 1847-48 and 1892-94.
If we view them as distinct entities, as the official NBER classification
does, there were 15. If, however, we combine the first with the earlier con
traction of 1845-46 and the second with that of 1890-91, which is what we do
in the table and which may make more sense from the standpoint of inter-
country comparisons, the total for the United States reduces to 23.
One aspect of these data that has attracted attention is the tendency for
the U.K. reference cycles to lag slightly those in the United States. Judged
in terms of the yearly dates, the lag for peaks and troughs combined is
approximately four-tenths of a year. The popular interpretation of this lag
views it as indicative of a systematic causal relationship running from the
United States to the United Kingdom. We present evidence later on, however,
that contradicts this interpretation particularly as it applies to the
cyclical contractions prior to the Civil War. Before we turn to that evidence,
however, it may be useful to examine the output and monetary data themselves.
To that end we present tables 2 and 3, in which we detail the movements in the
neighborhood of reference cycle peaks in the United States and United Kingdom,
respectively, of business activity and of two monetary variables, the monetary
gold (or total specie) stock, and either the M2 definition of the overall
money stock or in the case of the United Kingdom prior to 1871, high-powered
money.
Judged on the basis of these data severe business contractions were a
common occurrence in both countries, in the United States even more so than in
the United Kingdom. During such episodes, output generally contracted sharply
in absolute terms. (Appendix B lists severe contractions.) In many of the
milder NBER reference cycles, however, the movements are virtually imperceptible:
real output actually increased and at an average rate close to its secular
rate of growth. The contraction that occurred in those episodes was in the
rate of growth relative to the rate in the previous expansion phase rather
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than in the level of output or in the rate of growth relative to its secular
average.
The most striking feature of the data is the clearcut association between
decreases in the rate of growth of money (or high-powered money) and cyclical
fluctuations in output. In the great majority of cycles in both countries,
the monetary stringency preceded or was coincident with the downturn in
output. The degree of stringency, moreover, in general conformed to the
severity of the cycle.
The gold stock often exhibits the same general patterns as M2. The
movements in gold, however, sometimes failed to account for anything close to
the full movement in M2. Furthermore, in several instances, there was little
or no correspondence between the two. In many of these episodes, as the
narrative below indicates, the cause of the monetary decline was a financial
panic that reduced the ratios of M2 and high-powered money to gold.
To investigate these relationships further we turn to the analysis of
severe individual cyclical contractions in the two countries, neglecting mild
cyclical contractions. We divided the seven episodes, and the accompanying
narrative, into four parts based on their chronological ordering. As it
turned out, these groups are also of some economic significance, with the
direction of transmission between the two countries differing considerably
among the groups. In the antebellum period, the United Kingdom appears to
have exerted the predominant influence. By the early twentieth century the
stiuation was reversed, the United States becoming the senior partner in the
process; the United Kingdom the junior.
3.1 Antebellum Cycles
The four major antebellum business contractions with which we deal are
those of 1836, 1839, 1845 and 1857. All four were relatively severe in at
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least one of the two countries. Most of these severe contractions, moreover,
were accompanied by substantial monetary decelerations. And all provide
evidence of a causal relationship running primarily from the United Kingdom to
the United States.
1836
According to Burns and Mitchell (19A6), the first of the two cyclical
contractions that marked the second half of the 1830s began in both the United
States and the United Kingdom in 1836, ended in the United Kingdom in 1837 and
in the United States a year later. In both countries, monetary factors
appeared to have played an important role, declines in either the stock of
specie or its rate of growth taking place at the onset of the business
declines and a further panic-induced decrease in the U.S. money stock
accompanying the more protracted and more severe drop in output there (see
Appendix B for further discussion). This latter monetary contraction,
moreover, appears attributable in large part to the restrictive policies of
the Bank of England, themeselves in turn the result of the Bank's reaction to
the drain of specie.
By all the measures we examined, the cyclical contraction in the United
States was relatively severe: Smith and Cole's (1933) separate domestic and
foreign trade indexes fell by average annual rates of 3.3 percent and 16.5
percent, respectively, between 1836 and 1838; Ayres' (1939) index of business
conditions at an annual rate over the same period of 8 percent; and Gallman's
(1966) real capital formation series by 13.8 percent between 1837 and 1838.
In the United Kingdom, the contraction was not only of shorter duration but
also apparently much milder, real GNP falling by 1.3 percent from 1836 to 1837
and then rebounding by 3.6 percent the next year.
Growth in the U.S. money stock began to decline prior to the cyclical
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peak and then turned negative: from an increase of 31.5 percent in 1835-36,
to 16.9 percent in 1836-37, to -3.4 percent in 1837-38. Specie accounted for
all the change in the rate of change of money between 1834 and 1836. The next
year, as a result of the banking panic, a decrease in the ratio of M2 to
specie became of primary importance.
For the United Kingdom, we have data only for specie and for high-powered
money. The total monetary specie stock exhibits a substantial decline in each
of the years from 1834 through 1836, as do the specie holdings of the Bank of
England, the more accurately measured component of that total. High-powered
money after declining in 1834 and 1835 increased by just under 1 percent in
1836 and just over 1 percent in 1837.
According to John Francis's (1862) account, the loss of specie by the
Bank prior to 1836 was a reflection of overseas investments gone sour. The
Bank's specie stock, which in 1833 had reached a high of 4:10.9 million, fell
from an average of i:8.2 million in mid-1834 to an average of -L6.2 million in
mid-1835. Then in the first quarter of 1836 the Bank's holdings temporarily
rose, only to resume their decline a quarter later as pressure from the United
States developed.
The Bank's reaction—belatedly, in the eyes of some contemporary
observers—was to increase its discount rate, from the 4.0 percent that had
prevailed for close to a decade to 4.5 percent in July 1836 and then 5 percent
in September. At the same time, the Bank imposed quantitative controls,
refusing to discount the bills of joint-stock banks or to handle acceptances
of Angol-American discount houses (Matthews, 1954 p. 58).
The first signs of a financial crisis in the United Kingdom came with the
suspension of payments of the Agricultural and Cononercial Bank of Ireland in
November 1836 and the near demise of the Northern and Central Bank, a recently
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formed Lancashire -joint-stock bank. The panic in the United States began in
the spring of 1837 with the failure of a New Orleans bank. A run soon
developed on New York banks and payment was suspended in May of that year.
What heightened the monetary effects of these actions, was the legislation
enacted by most states that prohibited banks that had suspended payments from
expanding their note and deposit liabilities. "Under these conditions," Clark
Warburton (1962) has claimed, "suspension of specie payments provided relief
from an immediate banking panic but led to a curtailment of bank loans and
discounts and contraction of bank supplied circulating medium."
Considerable debate has centered around the exact events that triggered
the U.S. crisis: the Specie Circular, the actions of the Bank of England, and
the sharp decline in the price of cotton all figuring prominently in the
various explanations offered. Those who have emphasized the first, moreover,
ascribe crucial importance to it as a cause of the business contraction
itself.
The monetary data belie that explanation. As we have shown, the first
year of the cycle in the U.S. was accompanied by a decline in monetary growth
that was wholly due to a decline in the rate of growth of the monetary specie
stock.^ That decline in turn was the result of the Bank of England's
restrictive posture and one of the causes of the ensuing banking crisis. What
added to the pressures on the banking system and indeed may have been the key
exacerbating element was the disbursement of the Treasury surplus to state
treasuries and hence drain of specie from the banking system (Timberlake,
1978). As the U.S. money stock fell, the economy deteriorated further. That
of the United Kingdom, which had escaped the contractionary monetary effects
of the panic, recovered.
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1839
The depression of 1839 was one of the most severe on record in both
countries. Real GNP in the United Kingdom fell for three years running for a
total decline of 7.2 percent, making it comparable in both magnitude and
duration to that of 1929-32. In the United States, the contraction lasted a
year longer and, as near as one can tell, was equally sharp. Smith and Cole's
total trade index fell by 21.4 percent from its peak in 1839 to its trough in
1843; their domestic index fell by 10 percent over the same period (12 percent
from 1839 to 1842); Gallman's capital formation series by 26.3 percent; and
Ayres' index of business activity by 22.0 percent. The only difference, other
than duration, between the U.K. and U.S. contractions was that the latter
appears to have been made up of two separate episodes: All four real series
for the United States show a substantial drop frm 1839 to 1840, a slight
pickup over the next year (next two in the case of capital formation) and then
in two of the remaining three instances a further decline of roughly the same
magnitude as that of 1839-40.
As in 1836, monetary fluctuations appear to have played important
causative roles in the two countries. In the United Kingdom, both gold and
high-powered money reached peaks in 1838, gold declining by 11.9 percent per
annum over the next two years and high-powered money by 6.6 percent per annum.
Then between 1840 and 1841 the U.K. gold stock reversed direction, increasing
by 4.4 percent, while high-powered money remained roughly constant.
In the United States, the monetary contracton began a year later than in
the United Kingdom. Gold fell by 6.9 percent and M2 by 11.1 percent between
1839 and 1840 and continued to decline the following year, though at slower
rates. In 1841-42, the decline in M2 accelerated and the gold stock fell
somewhat further. By the time the trough in both monetary series had been
15
reached, the gold .stock had decreased by a cumulative total of 12 percent and
M2 by a cumulative total of 32 percent. The only comparable period of
monetary contraction in the hundred years that our data span is the Great
Depression of 1929-33.
The lag between monetary changes in the two countries at the beginning of
the cyclical declines suggests a chain of causation that ran from the United
Kingdom to the United States. Historical accounts buttress this conclusion.
In early 1839, the Bank of England began to experience another specie drain.
The cause, according to Matthews (1954), was an increase in expenditures on
imports of grain, due in turn to a crop failure the year before. A
contributing factor, according to some commentators, was a lack of trust on
the continent in the Bank's ability to maintain specie payments.
The Bank reacted to the outflow by raising its discount rate in May of
1839 from 4 percent to 5 percent. By that time, its specie reserve had been
almost halved, from i9.0 million in January to million in May. In late
June it raised Bank rate further to 5.5 percent and finally in the beginning
of August to 6 percent. As a result of these actions, out and out panic in
never really took place in the United Kingdom.
More harmful repercussions of the Bank's actions were, however, felt in
Che United States. Interest rates rose markedly, Bigelow's commercial paper
rate series showing an increase from 6 percent in January to 15 percent in
August. At the same time, banks in the United States were losing specie. In
July, the Bank of United States, by then a Pennsylvania-chartereH bank, began
experiencing trouble. By early October it failed and a run on Philadelphia
banks began. They suspended payments in response and banks in the South and
West soon followed suit. The New York banks held out, but according to the
state bank commissioners, cited by Sumner (1896), experienced a $20 million
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decrease in their liabilities in the space of three months ending in late
January 1840.
1845
According to the National Bureau's chronology, the United Kingdom in the
second half of the 1840s experienced a three-year contraction, lasting from
1845 to 1848 and the United States two-one year contractions spaced one year
apart. Output data, however, tell a different story.
In the United Kingdom, real GNP increased by 6.4 percent from 1845 to
1846 before slowing to an average annual growth rate of slightly less than 1
percent the next two years. In the United States, Smith and Cole's trade
indexes show peaks in 1844, slight declines between 1844 and 1845, and then
offsetting increases the next year. The level of the total index (the
combination of domestic and foreign) was the same in 1847 as 1844; the
domestic index alone, the same in 1846 as 1844. Between 1847 and 1848 both
then decreased substantially, the total by 6.9 percent and the domestic alone
by 5.7 percent. Gallman's capital formation series after rising by 25.7
percent from 1845 to 1846 shows a 1.1 percent increase during the next year
and then a 7.4 percent average annual rate of decline the following two.
In both countries, therefore, the pattern is similar even though the
reference cycle chronology differs. Whatever contraction took place in 1845-
47 was relatively mild. Over the next year, the situation worsened and in the
United States apparantly by a considerable degree.
The monetary data are in rough agreement with the movements in output.
High-powered money in the United Kingdom rose at an average annual rate of 4.2
percent from 1844 to 1846 and in the next three years fell at an average
annual rate of 6.1 percent. In the United States, M2 after rising by 10.4
percent per year from 1842 to 1844, increased by only 4.1 percent per year
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over the next two,- accelerated the following year, and then declined by 2.6
percent between 1847 and 1848. The only surprise in the data is that the U.K.
recession does not appear to have been worse, given the amplitude and duration
of the monetary contraction.
Movements in the gold stock of the two countries in general conform to
those of the other monetary aggregates. The U.K. gold stock decreased
slightly between 1844 and 1846, after rising by 14.0 percent per year the
prior two years, and then fell by 2.6 percent per year from 1846 to 1849, with
the largest annual decrease, 9.8 percent, coming in 1847-48. The U.S. gold
stock behaved in like fashion, increasing by 11.3 percent per year between
1842 and 1844, falling by 2.9 percent per year over the next two years, then
increasing by 15.0 percent from 1846 to 1847 and finally between 1847 and 1848
dropping by 2.6 percent.
In both countries, therefore, the decreases in gold in the earlier part
of the period were at least partially offset while those at the end of the
period led to actual decreases in broader monetary aggregates. As in the two
earlier contractions, the sequence of events seems to have been a specie drain
in the United Kingdom, in this instance particularly due to a trade deficit
brought about by the Irish potato famine, subsequent increases in Bank rate
(in 1847) to check the drain, and as a result a sizable gold outflow from the
United States.
In the United Kingdom, an exacerbating factor, at least as far as the
monetary situation was concerned, was the widespread financial panic that
began in the summer of 1847 and continued through the fall (see Dornbusch and
Frenkel, this volume). The cause, contemporary observers claimed, was the
gold outflow and the Bank's failure to contract its note issue gradually when
the outflow began. Sir Robert Peel phrased his criticism thus: "If the bank
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had possessed the resolution to meet the coming danger by a contraction of its
issues, by raising the rate of discount, by refusing much of the accommodation
which they granted between the years 1844 and 1846...the necessity for
extrinsic interference might have been preventedj it might not have been
necessary for the Government to authorize a violation of the Act of 1844"
(MacLeod, 1896, p. 148).
The United States too expereinced a panic though not nearly so severe as
the one in the United Kingdom: "embarrassments were slight and brief,"
according to Juglar (1916). The reason, as Warburton (1962) has pointed out,
quite likely was the U.S. Treasury's purchase of government securities under a
resale agreement that offset the initial declines in the money multiplier.
1856
The business contractions in the late 1850s—1856-58 in the United
States; 1857-58 in the United Kingdom—took on familiar dimensions: pressure
on domestic gold stocks, a reaction by the Bank of England, panic, and then a
monetary contraction in both countries.
The only difference between this and past cycles was in the accidentals.
The Bank's defensive actions, for example, in this episode came in two stages
rather than the heretofore usual one. Similarly, the major focus of
investment in the period preceding the panic was different from those of the
1830s and 1840s. Hence, so also were the areas—both geographic and economic
in which the most notable bankruptcies and failures occurred.
The behavior of output requires only slight elaboration. A. relatively
severe contraction took place in both countries. In the United Kingdom it was
brief, but, as reference-cycle dates suggest, in the United States somewhat
more protracted.
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The pattern of movemetns in the various monetary totals was similar to
Chat described for earlier cycles. In the United Kingdom, a net gold inflow,
which had produced a 6.3 percent per year increase in the monetary gold stock
from 1854 to 1855, ceased the year after, and the gold stock remained nearly
constant on a yearly basis. Then in 1857, the drain began, and gold declined
by 5.5 percent. High-powered money behaved in virtually identical manner:
annual rates of change of 7.2 percent, 1.3 percent, and -6.3 percent in the
three years, respectively.
In the United States, gold never decreased absolutely but between 1856
and 1857, it rose by only 2.2 percent after having increased at an average
annual rate of 12.6 percent in the preceding three years. The data for M2
show movements similar to those of gold: a 7.7 percent average annual rate of
growth from 1853 to 1856, a 0.9 percent drop the next year and then a slight
1.0 percent rise the year after.
These yearly data, therefore, suggest that the slowdown in gold inflows
in 1856 was the initiating factor in the cyclical declines. As its gold
reserves decreased, the Bank of England raised its discount rate by 250 basis
points in the space of a week in October of that year. That, in turn,
intensified the pressure on the United States where banks in New York and on
the rest of the east coast were already trying to cope with an internal drain.
They reacted by building up their reserves (Temin,'1975), thus, adding to the
contraction in money. Insolvencies and suspension of payments followed in the
late summer and early fall.
Then, the panic and run on banks spread to the United Kingdom. In
November, even after having raised its discount rate from 5.5 percent to 10
percent in the short span of five weeks, the Bank of England asked for a
suspension of the Banking Act of 1844. Suspension allowed it to expand its
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note issue and by-December, the panic was over. The number of failures,
however, rose considerably. A recession that initially had a mild impact in
both countries, intensified and spread, mainly in the United States.
Given the linkages between the two countries, it is doubtful that the end
result could have been much different in any event. Had the Bank of England
not reacted to the pressure on its reserves in 1856, a contraction in money
would have taken place sooner than that year in the United Kingdom and
presumably so also would the recession. The Bank's actions merely staved both
off for awhile. That, however, added to the problem in the United States. As
it became more and more severe the feedback to the United Kingdom became
greater and greater. A panic in the United Kingdom resulted and recession
began in earnest there too.
3.2 The Greenback Period
During the 17 years when the Untied States was off the gold standard, the
close economic linkages with the United Kingdom that existed prior to the
Civil War broke down. Cyclical fluctuations took place at one time in one
country and not in the other. And even in the instances in which there was a
temporal coincidence, the channels through which these fluctuations might have
spread were less than obvious. As illustrations of the two types of episodes
respectively, we discuss the U.K. contraction of 1866 and the coincident
contractions of 1873.
1866
The contraction of 1866 in the United Kingdom and associated panic,
produced no reaction in the United States. The contrast between this episode
and the four just described thus provides one bit of evidence on the role the
gold standard played in the transmission of fluctuations among countries. It
is important to note, however, that this evidence is not totally unambiguous.
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The contraction in- the United Kingdom was not severe. One could argue—though
1836 seems to run counter to this hypothesis—that the non-monetary linkages
between the two countries were more important than the monetary and that their
operation, in turn, hinged on the severity of the initial contraction.
In terms of yearly GNP, the contraction of 1866 to 1868 manifested itself
as a decline in the rate of growth, not an absolute decrease. Commensurate
declines occurred in the rates of growth of gold and of high-powered money and
in the level of joint-stock bank liabilities. The decline in gold, however,
came in 1867-68 the second year of the recession.
The decrease in the ratio of high-powered money to gold and, judging from
Collins's (1981) series for liabilities of joint-stock banks probably also the
ratio of M2 to gold, was due to the banking difficulties that began in early
1866. Its cause in turn, both Clapham (19A5) and MacLeod (1896) claim, was a
drain on the Bank's specie reserves that began in late 1865 and induced the
by-Chen-usual sharp increase in Bank rate. In February 1866, the first
failure occurred, that of the Joint Stock Discount Company. In March,
Earned's Bank in Liverpool, stopped payment. The highlight of that decade's
panic was, however, the failure of Overend, Gurney and Company on the 10th of
May with liabilities of over -felO million. The next day, the Banking Act of
1844 was suspended and the panic subsided.
1873
The contraction of 1873 in the United States by Burns and Mitchell's
reckoning was the longest on record, not ending until 1878. The period of
actual decline or sluggish growth in real income, however, was much shorter,
1873 through 1875. From then on, real NNP rose rapidly, though prices
continued to fall.
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The panic that took, place in September of 1873 in the United States seems
to have been largely domestic in origin. Friedman and Schwartz (1963a) cite
the financial difficulties of certain U.S. railroads and the resulting default
on their debt as the precipitating factor. What seems to have set the stage
for the panic was the substantial reduction in U.S. greenbacks and hence in
bank reserve ratios that occurred in the first half of 1873.
The United Kingdom escaped the worst part of the U.S. panic. It affected
equity prices and led to a crisis on the London Stock Exchange, but there were
no further monetary reprecussions. The Bank of England, as it had through
1873, altered its discount rate promptly, increasing it to a high of 9 percent
on November 7, 1873, and then in the space of four weeks lowering it back to 5
percent. Peel's Act, contrary to the fears of the time, was not suspended and
a full-fledged panic was averted. "After 1873," Claphara (1945) states,
"neither 9, nor 8, nor even 7 percent was announced again for a whole
generation. An occasional 5 and a very occasional 6 was all that proved
necessary..."
The rate of growth of M2 slowed appreciably in the United Kingdom in
1873, to 5.6 percent versus 9.3 percent the year before, while the rate of
growth of the monetary gold stock declined by less than a percentage point
during the same period. Real GNP grew at an average annual rate of 2.7
percent in 1873-74, about equal to that of 1872. Not until 1875 did real
growth slow to any great extent but then until the reference-cycle trough, its
average rate of increase was only 0.4 percent per year.
Movements in M2 in the United Kingdom from 1874 on ran roughly parallel
to those in real GNP; a further fall in the rate of increase of M2 between
1874 and 1875, near constancy in 1875-76, and then absolute declines in the
stock during the last three years of the contraction.
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The cause of the restrictive movements in U.K. money was to a large
extent, particular-ly in the years 1873-75, a series of declines in the rate of
growth of high-powered money. These in turn, were only partially the result
of gold flows. In the latter part of the period, a decline in the ratio of M2
to high-powered money became important.^ That in turn appears to have been
the result of the failure of the City of Glasgow Bank in early October 1878
and the substantial increase in Bank rate in the middle of that month.
The cyclical contraction of the 1870s, therefore, had two elements in
common with the U.K. contraction of 1866: the United States was off the gold
standard and the channels of transmission of the type that were important
prior to the Civil War appear not to have operated. Unlike 1866, however,
these contractions were severe. That, in turn, is one small bit of evidence
in favor of our interpretation of 1866. If the sole reason that the earlier
episode was confined to the United Kingdom was its lack of severity, there
ought to have been some discernable linkages between the cycles in the two
countries in 1873. The fact that there were none, or almost none, suggests
that the monetary system rather than moderation of the episode was the key
reason there was no transmission to the United States in 1866.
3.3 The Heyday of the Gold Standard
The United States returned to gold in 1879. During the next three and a
half decades the United Kingdom and the United States underwent three common
business cycles of more than average severity. None of the three, however,
was an exact replica of the antebellum episodes. In the first, which began in
1882 in the United States and a year later in the United Kingdom, developments
in the United States affected the United Kingdom at the start of the cycle,
not until later did feedback occur. In the second, direct links between the
two countries seem to have been minimal. Only in the third, the short-lived
but nonetheless substantial contraction of 1907, was a strong influence
running from the United Kingdom to the United States apparent at t^^® onset of
thp cvcle.
2A
1882
The contractions of the early 1880s were moderately severe in both
countries. In the U.K. cycle, dated 1883-86, real income grew at an average
annual rate of less than 1 percent; in the U.S. one, dated 1882-85, real
income was virtually constant for three years as a whole.
The decline in the rate of growth of the U.S. money stock was particularly
dramatic, from an average of 19.3% per year in 1879-81, to an average of 6.9
percent in 1881-83, to virtually zero in 1883-84. It reflected a similar
series of declines in the rate of growth of the monetary gold stock.
In-contrast, only a mild decrease in rates of growth occurred in the U.K.
money stock during the contraction—in average terms, they were about a
percentage point lower in 1883-86 than in 1881-83. High-powered money,
however, declined in absolute terms in each year of the contraction and the
gold stock in two of those three years.
The drain of gold from the United Kingdom was the culmination of "a
movetnent that had begun in 1879 and that by 1882 had resulted in a cumulative
decrease of close to 10 percent. The direction of movement was from the
United Kingdom and other European countries to the United States and its cause
poor harvests in most of the world and exceptionally good ones in the United
States.
The response of the Bank of England to these drains was to raise its
discount rate from 2.5 percent in April 1881 to 6 percent in January 1882.
The end result was a cessation of inflows to the United States, "and a
diminished rate of outflow, followed by an actual inflow of gold to the United
Kingdom*
According to Friedman and Schwartz (1963a), the reversal of the gold flow
was one of the factors, along with foreigners' decreased confidence in
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investment in the-United States and in the country's ability to remain on the
gold standard, that precipitated a short-lived financial panic in New York.in
May 1884.
The antebellum problems, therefore, reemerged in the postbellum period.
The major differences were the milder fluctuations in output in the 1880s
episode than in earlier ones and the reversed direction of causation at the
start of the contraction—from the United States to the United Kingdom rather
than the other way around.
1890
The U.K. cyclical decline began in 1890 and ended in 1894, making it one
of the longest in that country's history. During the same period, the United
States experienced two contractions: an exceedingly mild decline between 1890
and 1891, followed by a sharp rise in real growth the next year and then a
much more severe decline between 1892 and 1894.
The U.S. contraction of 1890-91 manifests itself in the yearly data as a
one-percentage point decline in the growth of real NNP and a four-percentage
point decline in the growth of industrial production from their respective
averages during the preceding two years. The money stock never fell but its
growth rate declined. The cause was a gold outflow brought about by a shift
of British investment to Argentina in mid-1890, at the same time New York
banks were experiencing the usual seasonal drain of specie reserves to
argicultural areas of the country. As a result, a number of bank failures in
the United States occurred during early November and, then, on November 15,
Baring Brothers, a major British merchant bank, suspended payment and the
panic intensified.
A month later, the panic in the United States was over. In the United
Kingdom, it threatened to become severe but never did. The Bank of England
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immediately prior ,to the demise of Barings, as it became cognizant of what was
likely to happen, raised the discount rate from 5 percent to 6 percent. Early
the next week, it borrowed i/d.3 million in gold from the Banque de France and
bought another il.5 million from Russia, thus further bolstering its reserves.
In the initial year of the U.K. cycle, the growth of both real GNP and
industrial production slackened. During the next two, industrial production
fell by 6.7 percent and real GNP remained virtually flat. By 1895, the
rebound was underway. Growth in the U.K. money supply for the cycle as a
whole declined but the major part of that came after 1892. Hence, even though
the reference cycle dates differ between the two countries, the time pattern
of output movements did not.
In the United States, gold movements figured prominently in the
explanation of movements in the money stock as a whole. The monetary gold
stock after falling by 8.7 percent in 1890-91, increased slightly the next
year, and then contracted sharply in 1893. The external drains reflected
distrust of the Treasury's ability to maintain silver at parity with gold as
well as price deflation abroad. At the same time, an internal drain took
place, the cause of which was distrust of the solvency of banks. The latter,
in turn, had its roots in the deflation that declines in capital gold inflows
had brought about earlier.
In the United Kingdom, a reduced gold inflow was associated with the
initial declines in monetary growth between 1891~92 and very likely 1892—93.
Thereafter, it was the nongold component of high-powered money that
arithmetically accounted for the low rate of monetary growth.
The U.S. contraction, therefore, quite clearly had international roots
but not as in many earlier cycles, ones that extended directly back to
Threadneedle Street. In the United Kingdom, the links with other countries
were less obvious.® .
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1907
The contractions of 1907-08 had many of the earmarks of earlier episodes.
From the spring of 1906 on, by Sayers's (1976) account, it became more and
more evident that financial difficulties were liable to break out in the
United States. In May and again in September of that year, the Bank of
England took defensive actions, in both instances increasing Bank rate from
3.5 percent to 4.0 percent, a decrease having been effected in June. At the
same time, it imposed quantitative restrictions, refusing to discount paper
used to finance American speculation. On October 5, it increased Bank rate
further, to 5 percent, and then on October 19 to 6 percent, the highest level
since the Baring Crisis in 1890. "These measures," Friedman and Schwartz
(1963a, p. 156) state, "served first to reduce, then to reverse, the flow of
gold to the United States, and in this and other ways contributed to a change
in the economic situation in the United States."
The changes in gold flows, however, only show up to a minor extent in the
annual data. The monetary gold stock in the United States after increasing by
4.4 percent per year on average in 1904 and 1905, rose dramatically in 1906, a
9.0 percent increase relative to the preceding year. In 1907, the increase
was only slightly less, 8.8 percent.
The monthly high-powered money series, which is apt to be more dominated
by gold than the money stock itself, registered a 2.8 percent annualized
decrease from May to September 1907 versus a 8.4 percent annualized decrease
in the stock of money. From then until February 1908, thfe money stock
continued to fall (at a 12.3 percent annual rate) while high-powered money
rose continuously. Not until July had money regained its May 1907 level. The
major factor accounting arithmetically for the decrease in money, therefore,
was the panic that broke out on October 21, 1907. It in turn was at least to
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some extent Che result of the previous gold outflow and its impact on the
reserve position of banks.
The contraction in output in the United States, though lasting only a
year, was sizable. Real NNP fell by 11.4 percent from 1907 to 1908 and
industrial production by 17.0 percent.
In the United Kingdom, the movements in both money and income were
considerably more moderate. Real GNF decreased by 1.0 percent, industrial
production by 8.4 percent and the rate of monetary gorwth by the same amount
as that of GNP. The cause of the monetary deceleration was a decrease in the
rate of growth of the monetary gold stock, from 3.4 percent in 1906-07 to 1.7
percent in 1907-08. As in the case of the United States, though, these
movements may well have been somewhat more severe when viewed interyearly.
Bank of England gold holdings, one of the few such series available, in March
1907 stood at i36 million. After rising by -£2 million between then and
September, holdings dropped to a low of less than -fcSO million on November 4.
The Bank's response to this outflow, as in the past, was to increase its
discount rate. It did so by successive 50 and then 100 basis point amounts
from 4.5 percent in September 1907 to 7 percent on November 4. These
increases, though probably necessary from the U.K. standpoint, worsened the
problem in the United States.
3.4 The Interwar Period
Taken together, the severe interwar contractions beginning in 1920 and
1929 provide almost a controlled experiment, the outcome of which demonstrates
the important roles played during business contractions by monetary fluctuations
within countries and by the gold standard in disseminating these fluctuations
among countries.^ In both periods, the United Kingdom and the United States
experienced sharp decreases in monetary growth beginning before the onset of
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recession. In 1921, the U.S. money supply rose while the U.K. money stock
declined further. The rebound in the U.S. economy was both rapid and strong;
the rebound in the U.K. economy was weaker and came later. In May 1931, the
United Kingdom broke with the gold standard, thereby severing the monetary
link with the United States. As a consequence, the United Kingdom was able to
increase its money supply over the next two years even as the U.S. money
supply continued to decline. The depression in the United Kingdom was thus
cut short while that of the United States itensified.
1920
The 1920-21 contractions in the United Kingdom and the United States were
two of the most severe one-year contractions of record. Both were accompanied
by equally severe monetary contractions. In the United Kingdom, the annual
data show a change in monetary growth of 14 percentage points: from 12.1
percent per year in 1919-20 to -2.3 percent in 1920-21. In the United States,
the monetary deceleration was equally dramatic: from 11.5 percent in the one
year to -.58 percent in the next.
The U.K. monetary contraction, like that of 1873 in the United States was
prompted by the desire to return to gold at the pre-World War I exchange rate.
Given the inflation that had taken place in the interim—an inflation
appreciably greater than in the United States—a substantial decrease in the
U.K. money stock was necessary. Monthly data compiled by Lothian (1976) show
monetary deceleration beginning in June 1919, nine months before the cycle
peak. The peaks in the annual (1920) and monthly (October 1920) money series
were followed by absolute declines that continued through 1925. In the United
States, the money supply began to grow again in 1922.
The real sides of the two economies reacted accordingly. In the United
States, both real income and industrial production picked up rapidly, thereby
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cancelling out th^ir initial declines a year sooner than in the United
Kingdom. There the process dragged on and not until 1924, did both U.K.
series return to levels consistent with a modest 2 percent per year rate of
growth. A year later, when the actual return to gold took place, a new
recession began.
The problems of the 1920s in the United Kingdom, therefore, appear to
have been largely monetary in nature. Underlying thoe monetary fluctuations
in turn were international considerations, in particular, the return to gold
at a price consistent with a $4.86/-fc exchange rate.
Keynes's assessment in the Treatise of Money (1930, II, p. 181) seems to
U8 to have been essentially correct:
Looking back, we see that the extreme prolongation of the slump was
due to the Profit Deflation which occurred in the first half of
1921. This was doubtless inspired by the object of concelling some
part of the Income Inflation of the war and post-war periods...But
from the standpoint of national prosperity it was a mistake. We
might have avoided most of the troubles of the last ten years...if
we had endeavoured to stabilise our monetary position on the basis
of the degree of Income Inflation existing at the end of 1920.
1929
Data for the U.K. money stock at the start of the contraction show a mild
deceleration. Yearly figures indicate a rise of 0.6 percent in 1928-29 versus
an average rise during the two preceding years of 1.8 percent. The monthly
data show a somewhat sharper falloff, from 3.2 percent growth over the 24
months ending January 1929—5 months prior to the cycle peak—to a 3.6 percent
decline in the money stock between then and January 1930.
31
From 1929 un^il the end of the cyele, the yearly data show a sluggish 0.6
percent annual rate of increase—an average of 0.8 percent incrase in 1929-30,
1.2 percenc decrease the next year, and 2.3 percent increase the year after
that. Movements in gold were largely responsible for the monetary stringency.
With the exception of 1929-30 when it rose by 5.4 percent, the monetary gold
stock declined in three of the four years from 1928 to 1932. It fell by 6.1
percent in 1928-29, by 10.2 percent in 1930-31 and then finally by 7.1 percent
in 1931-32. Real GNP in the United Kingdom over the whole period fell by 5.7
percent and industrial production by 11.4 percent.
In the United States, the money supply declined by a much greater amount
during the period of the U.K. contraction, 8.7 percent per year from 1929 to
1932. Moreover, it continued to decline at a 2.0 percent average annual rate
from 1932 to 1934. Both real income and industrial production fell precipitously
as a result: real NNP by a total of 34.5 percent from 1929 to 1932 and
industrial production by a total of 62.7 percent. The U.S. declines continued
into 1933. And, contrary to the experience of the United Kingdom, neither
reached its 1929 level until almost the end of the decade.
The 1929 contraction thus was marked by a reversal of the U.S. and U.K.
roles in 1920. In that cycle, the United States became expansive earlier and
thus escaped the problems that plagued the U.K. economy in the 1920s. In the
second cycle, the U.K., abandoning gold in 1931, was able to avoid the further
monetary contraction that took place in the United States. As a result, the
U.K. economy rebounded more quickly in the 1930s than the U.S. economy did.^®
During both interwar cycles, gold was in one way or another a key. The
commitment to the return to the gold standard provided the impetus for British
deflation in the first instance; the abandonment of gold was the sine qua non
for avoidance of further deflation in the second.
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3.5 Conclusions from the Historical Analysis
Our analyses of individual reference cycle contractions, to our minds,
strongly suggests that money was an, and most likely the, important causative
factor in the major cyclical contractions in both countries. In almost all of
the episodes a clearcut association is evident between monetary decelerations
and movements in output. That association, moreover, does not appear to be
simply a reflection of reverse causation.
For one thing the monetary shocks, as we have measured thera, in almost
all instances preceded or were coincident with the cyclical contractions. In
relatively few instances did the monetary deceleration come after the fact.
Nor do we find it plausible to believe that the association between money and
output is largely the result of some common third factor that affects both
variables. For one thing, the proximate causes of the monetary declines
differed considerably across cycles, suggesting the absence of any simple
mechanism to account for either feedback or the operation of such a third
variable.
Similarly, additional comparisons (described in appendix B) allow us to
rule out one potential and often suggested candidate, financial panics. A
final bit of evidence is the difference in the incidence and duration of
cyclical fluctuations between gold and nongold standard periods. Direct
monetary linkages were weaker in the latter; so also was the association
between the cycles in the two countries.
These results also provide evidence on how the transmission-mechanism
worked. Gold flows clearly were of direct importance in a considerable number
of episodes. They also appear to have had an indirect effect in a number of
others, acting as the proximate cause of financial crises that in turn led to
substantial reductions in the ratios of commercial bank note and deposit
liabilities relative to gold.
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The analysis ,of the individual cycles, however, is rather moot with
respect to other possible channels of influence—price and interest rate
arbitrage and direct absorption-type effects on output. It also provides only
limited information on the extent of feedback in the system. In addition it
is almost solely concerned with severe cycles, which according to Cagan (1965)
differ qualitatively from the less severe. At the same time it raises a
number of questions about the stability of the relationships between the two
countries over time. To try to resolve some of these issues, we now turn to
the more formal statistical investigation.
4 Econometric Evidence
We estimate vector autoregressive models for the two countries combined
and then use these models as the basis for conducting a series of tests of
Granger causality.The advantage of these models is that they allow for
simultaneous dynamic interaction among the variables while at the same time
requiring relatively few identifying restrictions. We view these traits as
particularly desirable in a study such as ours, which is concerned with short-
run adjustment within and between economies of somewhat uncertain degrees of
openness. They require neither answers before the fact to the series of
largely unsettled issues surrounding cross-country channels of transmission
and feedback mechanisms linking within-country variables, nor explicit
modeling of a host of possible alternative dynamic•relationships of both
sorts.
Given the attention they have received, however, the' objecfions to these
models and the associated Granger tests also require mention. Foremost among
these objections are specification errors of the types outlined by Zellner
(1979) and by Sims (1982). Having some notion of the possible temporal
orderings of variables under different hypotheses and initially choosing those
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variables on the basis of theoretical considerations, however, can reduce the
likelihood of such.errors and thus limit the effects on the statistical
inferences being made.^^
4.1 Model and Method
We consider a 2-country macroeconoraic model that emphasizes monetary
variables. Each variable in the model is represented as a multivariate vector
stochastic process (Sims, 1980). In particular, the general, unrestricted
autoregressive reduced form is:
(1) - ti(L) + "c' ^ ^
(mxl) (m5<m) (in>«l)
where [X^ ^^1 = a vector containing current (one period lagged) values
of m different economic variables (or their rates of change)
•n"(L) ® an matrix that contains polynomials in the lag operator
that are one-sided on the past
= a vector containing a random disturbance for each of the
m equations; is multivariate normal with
E U = 0, and E U U ^ = 2.
In this specification, all variables contained in are considered (poten
tially) endogenous, and in simultaneous-equation terminology, the set of predetermined
variables that are regressors contains only lagged values of endogenous
variables. The set of current exogenous variables is empty.
This is the model that we then use to conduct the Granger tests. To
illustrate these tests in a single equation context consid^er the first
equation of the m-equation system (1):
(2) - i-iCL) +Bit - 'ija) Xjt-l +"it
. ir^j^CL) + ... + X„t-1 "if
t*l»••«! T> \
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where is the (n+l)-th order polynominal in the lag operator applicable
to the j-th variable in the i-th equation. The null hypothesis that Xj^ does
not Granger cause is the restriction that all coefficients of the polynomial
lag operator zero, i.e., that all lagged values
of Xjn are excluded from the equation.
We perform the test that Xnj does not cause by comparing the error sum
of squares of a model with q linear restrictions imposed on the coefficients
A
of Trj(L) (ESS(w)] with the error sum of squares of an unrestricted model
fESSCn)]. To do so we use the statistic
(. \ESSM~ESSCQ)]/<1
^ ESSCfi)/[T-k]
which has an F distribution with q and T-k [=T-m(n+l)l degrees of freedom.
If we fail to reject the null hypothesis, then X^, does not Granger-cause X|.
If we reject the null hypothesis, then X^j, said to Granger-cause Xj^ and we
would like to think there is a behavioral structure underlying the reduced-
form specification of the equation system (Sims, 1980).
We perform these Granger tests in two different contexts: (a) single
equations (univariate models) independent of the other il equations in the
macroeconomic model system and (b) two or more equations jointly within the
i2-equation system (multivariate models). Our single equation tests of the
null hypothesis that Xjj, does not Granger-cause Xj^ are themselves of two types,
weak and strong. The weak tests are essentially pairwise comparisons in which
the "unrestricted" version of the test equation contains values of only two
variables and is of the form:
(4) (I) a) + UJ
t « 1 T
where an asterisk indicates that the relevant terms are part of a two-variable
rather than the more general m-vai;iable system.
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On this we impose the restriction that the coefficients of are all zero.
The disadvantage of this test is that one might falsely reject the null
hypothesis because of omitted-variable bias in the estimates of
•''*(L), resulting from exclusion of lagged values of X2 through . One or
more of these may be truly Granger-causing , but we could erroneously reach
the opposite conclusion if the variable being analyzed were correlated with
one or more of the other variables. Accordingly, we also employ a single-
equation strong test that X^ does not Granger-cause by imposing the restrictions
on equation (2) that the coefficients of 'Tjjjj(L) are all zero. It tells us
whether Xjjj contributes significantly to explaining the variance in Xj, holding
variables X2 through Xjjj constant. Tables 4 and 5 contain the results of these
two sets of tests, respectively; table 7 contains an overall summary of these
and of subsequent test results.
The final tests that we perform are tests of multiple causes. These also
are of two types. The first multiple-cause tests are on each of the single
equations taken independently of the other 11 equations of the system. In
these tests, the unrestricted regression is of the form of equation (2). The
restriction iis that all coefficients of all of the polynomial lag operators
applying to either all foreign variables or all domestic variables other than
the regressand are zero.
The other multiple-cause tests are tests on two or more equations joint
ly. In conducting these tests, we take account of the contemporaneous corre
lations across all 12 equations of our macro-economic system. Tiiese tests are
the direct analogues in a multi-equation context of the single-equation
multiple-cause tests we have just described. Under the various null hypothe
ses we impose restrictions on entire blocks of the coefficient matrix "^CL)
rather than on portions of one particular row.
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The F-statistics for the tests on single equations are reported in table
6, part A, and chi-squared statistics for joint tests across two or more equa
tions are reported in part B. For the latter test, we base our conclusions on
Sims' (1980) version of the chl-squared statistic, which is reported in
columns (la) and (2a) of Table 6, but we also report the other frequently used
chi-squared statistic in columns (lb) and (2b).
To make the model operational for the study of macroeconomic Interrelationships
between the United Kingdom and the United States during the gold standard
period, we initially assigned the following 12 variables to the X matrix in
equation (1):
YS = U.S. real NNP, or prior to the Civil War a proxy
PS = U.S. NNP deflator
FRS = U.S. specie reserves
IS = U.S. short-term interest rate
DCS ® U.S. domestic credit component of high-powered money
NS = U.S. population
YK = U.K. real GNP
PK U.K. GNP deflator
FRK » U.K. specie reserves
IK = U.K. short-term interest rate
DCK = U.K. domestic credit component of high-powered money
NK = U.K. population
We used annual data to estimate the model over the combined" subperiods
1837-59 and 1882-1914.15 omitted the Civil War and Greenback periods since
the United States was off the gold standard during those years. Additional
observations at the start of each subperiod were lost in differencing and in
the process of taking lags.
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With the exception of interest rates and monetary variables, we entered
all variables in the model as percentage rates of change. For interest rates
we used first differences of levels and for the monetary variables first
differences of levels scaled by the level of high-powered money. The latter
is equivalent to weighting the percentage rates of change of the DC and FR
variables by their shares in high-powered money. In each instance the
equations included an intercept term, a dummy variable for the second
subperiod and two lagged values of each of the independent variables.
We estimated all equations using ordinary least squares. In our multivariate
multiple-cause tests, we do, however, take account of contemporaneous cross-
equation correlation of error terms. These cross-equation correlations may
be an important source of business-cycle transmission.
4.2 Tests Based Upon The Full Model
Since our principal interest is in the real income tests, we turn to
these first. Here the results are rather mixed. In the single-equation weak
form tests we find some direct influence of monetary variables on real income
in the two countries: FRK is a significant predictor of both YK and YSjand
FRS (as well as PS) approach significance in the YK relationship. In
addition IS, which in turn is influenced by FRS, DCS and DCK, signficantly
affects both YK and YS. In the strong form tests, however, most of these
relationships break down: FRS is significant at the 10 percent level in
predicting YK; at somewhat less than the 10 percent level in predicting YS.
Nothing else apparently matters.
The single-equation multi-cause tests reported in the top half of table 6
are even less informative. For both YK and YS we are unable to reject either
the null hypothesis of no domestic cause or of no other-country cause.
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There are a number of possible reasons for our failure to find much in
the way of a relationship here. One is that a strict version of the rational
expectations natural rate hypothesis holds (Sargent, 1976; Leiderman, 1980).
Another is that some subset of the variables—say foreign reserves and
domestic credit—is jointly significant but that their effects are being
masked by the inclusion of a large number of truly insignificant variables. A
third, which is related to the second, and to which we return below, is that
we have misspecified the monetary variables. A further possible reason for
little or no influence of other variables on real income in the two countries
is that there are common shocks—financial panics are an obvious example—that
we have failed to take into account.
In the multivariate multi-cause tests reported in the bottom of table 6
we allow for such shocks by taking account of contemporaneous cross-equation
correlation of the errors. In these tests, when either of the real income
variables is examined in conjunction with the domestic price and interest
variables or with all five other domestic variables, we almost always reject
the null hypotheses of no domestic and no other-country causes.
These last results, therefore, suggest that there was a set of mechanisms
by which disturbances were transmitted internationally. They say nothing,
however, about either the relative importance of the different variables in
the different equations or the specific channels of transmission.
We can get some notion of both by examining some of the other single
equation test results. The price equations are particularly interesting in
both regards. For the United Kingdom as well as the United States in both
the weak- and strong-forms of the tests, own-country foreign reserves and
domestic credit as well as own-country rate of interest are significant
predictors of own-country price level. For the U.K. price level there is also
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Granger-causation.running from the U.S. price level. A similar arbitrage
relationship appears to exist between interest rates in the two countries.
The U.S. rate Granger-causes the U.K. rate in both the weak- and strong-form
tests.
The results are consistent with the existence of a specie-flow channel
linking the two countries and, to a lesser extent, direct price and interest
rate arbitrage channels. They are, however, inconsistent with the simplest
model of the monetary approach to the balance of payments. It assumes that
arbitrage is complete within the period, suggesting, therefore, that the
domestic price level either Granger-causes Or is contemporaneously correlated
with money. Correspondingly, it views domestic credit as only affecting the
stock of foreign reserves and not the nominal money stock or the price level.
More general models of the types estimated by Darby and Stockman (1983) appear
to be required to describe the historical data.
The foreign reserve and domestic credit tests for the two countries
contain additional information bearing on these subjects. In the strong-tests
(but not the weak) we find Granger-causation of FRS by FRK. The reverse
relationship, however, does not hold. At the same time, we find Granger
causation of FRS by DCS. There is, therefore, a further suggestion of a
specie-flow channel as well as of a relation between domestic credit and
foreign reserves of the kind posited in a broad class of monetary models. No
consistency in these relationships between countries is, however, shown.
Moreover the direction of influence uncovered for foreign reserv'es, United
Kingdom to United States, is the reverse of that suggested by the price-level
and interest-rate tests.
The remaining set of relationships that are of some interest are those
for domestic credit. U.K. real income appears to Granger-cause domestic
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credit, being sigrrificant at the 5 percent level in the strong form tests and
at close to the 10 percent level in the weak-forra. The U.S. weak-form tests
give evidence of Granger-causation of DCS by FRK and IS and perhaps also by
DCK and PS. In the strong form tests DCK and perhaps IK Granger cause DCS.
One possible interpretation of the U.K. results is in terms of a reaction
function of the Bank of England. In the case of the United States, which over
this period had no central bank, what we may be capturing are the effects of
U.K. monetary pressures on the fiduciary component of commercial bank note
issues.
4.3 Further Tests of the Real Income Relationship
As mentioned, a potential source of bias in the real-income tests stems
from the way we entered the monetary variables. For both countries we
disaggregated high-powered money into domestic and foreign components. By
using high-powered money alone, we ignore any contribution the money
multiplier might have made. And to the extent that domestic credit and
foreign reserves are perfect substitutes in their effects on real income,
treating them separately may bias the case against finding Granger causation.
Testing the two monetary variables jointly would solve the second problem
but not the first. Accordingly, we reran the real income tests using U.S. M2
and, since it is all that is available, U.K. high-powered money in place of
the other monetary variables. We report the test results based upon this
model in table 8.
The results paint quite a different picture than the previous ones.
Unlike the earlier results, they show a clearcut association between own-
country money and real income. In all four instances—YK vs. HK and YS va.
MS, in both forms of the test—we find Granger causation from the monetary
variable to income. The relationships, however, are not simple. Other-
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country money also, has significant effects both on own-country money and on
own-country real income in all the comparisons. Similarly, for the United
Kingdom there is evidence of reverse causation, YK having a significant effect
on HK. We thus find what we failed to establish in the earlier set of
results. At the same time, additional evidence emerges of a complex system of
interaction between the two countries operating through monetary channels.
The relations uncovered between other country money and own-country real
income are particularly intriguing. One possible explanation is that what we
are capturing with other-country money is the effect of monetary shocks abroad
on the money multipliers and, hence, on real income in the two countries. For
the United Kingdom, we have been forced to use high-powered money alone so
this explanation is particularly plausible. For the United States the deposit
data for the antebellum period are likely to be subject to substantial error.
Movements in U.K. high-powered money, therefore, may be a proxy for movements
in the true U.S. money stock that are not reflected in movements in the mea
sured money stock.
The alternative explanation is that it is a reflection of some underlying
behavioral relationship. One possibility is that the two monies were close
substitutes from the standpoint of domestic money holders in the two
countries. In that case, the true money stock in each country would be some
weighted average of measured U.K. money and of measured U.S. money, with the
weights most likely varying from the one country to the other. A further
possibility is that we are capturing some aspect of the a'djustmemt mechanism
linking the two countries, rather than some aspect of a steady-state
equilibrium relationship such as currency substitution. Asset-market
adjustment, across a wider spectrum than the short-term financial assets whose
1 R
yields we include in the model, is a potential candidate.
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4.4 Conclusions from the Tests
Some of the explanation of results have been conjectural. In addition,
certain relationships appear implausible a priori; certain others appear incon
sistent with findings that are capable of rationalization. Viewed as a whole,
however, the results do tell a story of simultaneous dynamic interaction between
the United Kingdom arid the United States that in broad outline jibes with the
inferences already drawn from the analysis of the data for individual reference
cycles. The monetary system appears to be of considerable importance in the
transmission mechanism. Monetary decelerations appear to be a significant
determinant of cyclical contractions in real income. The evidence for monetary
causes and transmission of business cycles is strongest when money is included
directly in the econometric analysis rather than its proximate determinants,
reserves and domestic credit. An additional source of business-cycle transmission
uncovered by the econometric analysis is through cross-equation correlation of
residuals in a multiple-equation monetary system.
5 General Summary and Conclusions
In investigating the causes and transmission of cyclical fluctuations
under the gold standard we pursued two different research strategies. We
began with an examination of each important cyclical episode on an individual
basis. The focus of that analysis was on the cyclical behavior of the
monetary data, the cross-country interrelationships between movements in the
specie and money stocks of the two countries, and the within-country
Interrelationships of those series and output. We then proceeded to estimate
vector-autoregressive macroeconomic models for the United Kingdom and United
States combined using variables that alternative hypotheses about cyclical
fluctuations and transmission during this period suggest are important. We
used the models in conducting a series of Granger tests, appropriate to both
sets of hypotheses.
Because the historical and the econometric exercises are largely com-
44
plementary, we have greater confidence in those findings that are conimon to the
two approaches. Here there are two items in particular that deserve coinment.
One is the ro-le of money in cyclical contractions. Taken together Che
two types of analyses indicate that monetary shocks were important independent
factors leading to or worsening the severity and duration of the contractions
in the two countries. During severe contractions, moreover, they appear to
have been the most important causative factor.
The other is the part played by the gold standard in the process. Both
the historical and the econometric analyses point to it as a key element in
the transmission mechanism. Reestablishment of the equilibrium conditions of
the system after a monetary shock in one country typically produced both gold
flows and also price- and capital-market adjustments. These in turn induced
cyclical fluctuations in output in the other. Gold outflows, moreover, were
particularly important in transmission, having two avenues of influence, not
only affecting high-powered money but also, in a considerable number of
episodes leading to financial crises and subsequent declines in the money
multiplier.
The two types of analyses, separately and combined, also suggest a number
of other conclusions of less importance, which we merely list:
(a) During the course of the sample period the United States and the
United Kingdom appear to have reversed their roles: the United Kingdom seems
to have been the senior partner prior to 1860; the United States in the first
three decades of the twentieth century; neither was clearly predominant during
the intervening years.
(b) Within those subperiods, however, causation was hot geo'graphically
unidirectional. Shocks initiated in one country that spilled over to the
other appear to have reverberated back to the originating country to greater
or lesser degree depending upon the particular episode.
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(c) Within countries there is evidence of a similarly complex
transmission mechanism. Income had feedback effects on money of at least .
occasional and probably of general importance in both the United Kingdom and
the United States.
(d) During the relatively short periods during which either the United
Kingdom or United States was off gold, transmission of cyclical fluctuations
is clearly less evident. Flexible exchange rates appear, therefore, to offer
some and perhaps a considerable degree of insulation against cyclical
contractions.
(e) Short-term independence of monetary policy was possible even under
the gold standard. The Bank of England often undertook defensive actions that
halted and then reversed specie outflows. Those actions, in turn, appear to
have had subsequent effects on income in both countries, moderating the
decline in the United Kingdom and aggravating the decline in the United States
From these findings, we draw several conclusions relevant to monetary
policy. Given the attention the gold standard has received in the United
States in recent years, these deserve explicit mention. The benefits of a
gold standard, as usually enumerated, are that it is both automatic and
impersonal and that it effectively constrains governments from using money
creation as a taxation device. Our analysis suggests that the automaticity
and impersonality were less than complete. The Bank of England's intervention
alluded to above was a prime example. More important, because cyclical
fluctuations were transmitted internationally with apparent ease under the
gold standard, one has to weigh the costs of a greater incidence of such
fluctuations against the benefits of a greater degree of secular price
stability.
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Notes
^Considerable debate has centered on this topic. See Pippenger's paper
in this volume for evidence supporting this statement.
^In Friedman and Schwartz's (1963) study of business cycles, for example,
changes in monetary growth were the causative variable. Fisher (e.g., 1934)
related cyclical movements in real variables to distributed lags of past
prices, the latter being identified by Fisher as an indicator of monetary
pressure.
^For a discussion of transmission in the Meade-Mundell framework see
Mussa's excellent survey article (1980).
^See Darby and Lothian (1983) for a discussion of how these various
channels of transmission operated during the fixed-exchange rate Bretton-Woods
period.
^In Appendix B we evaluate these two hypotheses. We conclude that the
monetary decline, rather than the panic itself was the major factor leading to
cyclical contractions in output,
^If the specie circular had been the cause of the monetary con
traction we would expect to see the ratio of money to specie rather than
specie itself account for the decline in monetary growth.
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^Between 1876 and 1879, the money stock decreased at an average annual
rate of 2.6% while high-powered money increased at an average annual rate of
1.7%.
^Ultimately, however, some reduction in the U.K. money supply and price
level would have had to occur given the reduction in both the United States
and the rest of the world. A largely domestic-induced decrease in the money
stock in this instance was the equilibrating factor. Had it not occurred, an
outflow of gold presumably would have been the main avenue through which
monetary deflation would have taken place.
^We stress the word "almost." The onset of the 1920-21 cycles poses a
particular problem in this regard. Both countries experienced substantial
monetary decelerations beginning at roughly the same time. The increase in
the discount rate by the Federal Reserve and subsequent reaction by the Bank
of England may have been the key factor here.
^^See Choudri and Kochin (1980) for evidence drawn from a number of
countries during the 1930s and Jonung (1981) for Sweden. Lothian (1981)
contains a further discussion of the U.K. vs. U.S. comparisons presented here.
^^In the presentation and discussion of the empirical results, we
concentrate exclusively on the Granger tests. An autoregressive system is
difficult to describe succinctly. Moreover, it is difficult to make much
sense of individual coefficients of the regressions equations since
coefficients on successive lagged values of a given variable tend to oscillate
in sign and there tends to be a complicated pattern of cross-equation
feedback. Additional insights into the performance of the system of equations
could be obtained by analyzing the system's responses to typical random
shocks.
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Cassese and Lothian (1982) contains a discussion of some of these issues,
in particular the relation between timing and causation in the context of inter
national transmission of economic disturbances. However, Hernandez-Iglesias and
Hernandez-Iglesias (1981) provide examples of models where economic causality may
be difficult to verify with tests based upon Granger's predictive concept of
causality.
^^The F-statistic is fairly robust to relaxing the assumption of
normality of the errors (Judge et al., 1980). Estimation and testing with
lagged endogenous variables relies on asymptotic distribution theory.
Autocorrelated error terms are a Serious potential source of problems.
^^Dhrymes (1970, pp. 34-40) presents the basic form of the test. Under
the null hypothesis, we impose q linear restrictions on the coefficients of
Ti(L). Applying the likelihood ration principle, we then arrive at the test
statistic (T-k) In [ , which has an asymptotic distribution where and
A
are estimates of the variance-covariance matrix of the error terms under the
restricted system associated with the null hypothesis and of the general
system, respectively. This form of the statistic is due to Sims (1980) who
argues that standard tests are biased toward rejecting the null hypothesis
when q approaches or exceeds T - k in size. He, therefore, suggests treating
the sample size as (T - k) rather than T in these cases.
l^Ideally we would have liked to have had quarterly or perhaps even
monthly data. Annual data can of course mask the timing relationships that
are central to our analysis. Unfortunately, however, no such intra-year data
are available in continuous form for anything even close to our full sample
period.
^^Tests presented in the earlier version of this paper based on a
slightly different body of data indicated possible hetrogeneity of the model
across these two subperiods. For this reason, we included the dummy variable
in each of the equations. Additional tests of lag length were not
inconsistent with the two-year distributed lags used here.
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^^Since only lagged values of the variables appear "on the right-hand side
of the equations, these tests are likely to understate the importance of the
arbitrage relationships. We, therefore, ran additional regressions, in the
first case of the contemporaneous percentage change in one country's price
level on the other's and in the second of the contemporaneous first difference
of the one country's interest rate on the other's. In both instances we also
included a dummy variable for intercept shift in the second subperiod. The
partial correlation between the price variables was .41 and between the
interest-rate variables .52. Both are significant at better than the .01
level.
The statistical significance uncovered in certain of the Granger tests,
however, suggests that neither process was complete within the year. For the
interest-rate relationship the lagged adjustment is suggestive of an asset-
market transmission mechanism of the type posited by Branson (1968, 1970).
For the price relationship, differences in the adjustment of prices of traded
and nontraded goods are a possible explanation. Lags in adjustment in the
goods and the bond markets together with the successful intervention
techniques followed by the Bank of England suggest that the simplest monetary
approach models are inappropriate for the period. Similar conclusions for
both the United States and the United Kingdom as well as six other industrial
countries during the post-World War II era, are presented in Darby and Lothian
(1983).
^®Brittain (1981) and Miles (1976) contain evidence derived from post-
World War II data for the U.S. and several other industrial countries and the
U.S. and Canada, respectively, that is consistent with the currency-
substitution hypothesis. Darby and Lothian (1983) in summarizing the findings
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of the National Bureau study The International Transmission of Inflation
present evidence that largely contradicts it. In their study of the United
Kingdom and United States, Friedman and Schwartz (1982) find for the gold-
standard portion of their period that other-country money did not affect own-
country nominal income in either instance but did affect the own-country price
level in both. Since their data are averages taken over reference-cycle phases,
the possibility of shorter-term effects on nominal (and real) income exists.
Further compounding the problem, is the evidence they present that such effects
were significant for the United Kingdom but not the United States post-191A.
The standard comment of further study of the question being required is,
therefore, more appropriate than usual.
l^Friedman and Schwartz (1963) for the United States after 1870,
Warburton (1958 and 1962) for the U.S. antebellum period, and our earlier
(1980) study for the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century contain results
consistent with this conclusion.
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U.K.
185A
1866
1883
1900
1917
1924
1927
-Peak—
U.S.
(1847)
1853
1864
1869
1882
1887
(1892)
1895
1899
1910
1918
1923
1926
Both
1836
1839
1845
1856
1860
1873
1890
1903
1907
1913
1920
1929
58
TABLE 10.1
U.S. and U.K. Calendar-year
Reference Cycle Dates
U.K.
1837
1842
1857
1862
1868
1870
1879
1886
1901
1926
1928
-Trough*
U.S.
1838
1843
(1846)
1858
1861
1867
1878
1885
1888
(1891)
1896
1900
1911
1924
1927
Both
1848
1855
1894
1904
1908
1914
1919
1921
1932
NOTE; Parentheses indicate NBER reference cycle contractions in the United
States that we have subsumed in our analysis into Sl longer corresponding
cycle for the two countries.
SOURCE: Burns and Mitchell (1946).
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ITABLE 10.6
Tests of Granger Causality in a Two Country Macroeconomic Model: No
Domestic Cause Versus No Other-Country Cause. U.S.-U.K. Gold Standard
Period 1837-1859, 1882-1914-
Model-
dependent
variable(s)
A. Univariate model—
<1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
YS
PS
IS
FRS
DCS
NS
(7) YK
(8) PK
(9)
(10)
(11) DCK
(12) NK
FRK
IK
No domestic
cause
(1)
1.24
3.73
3.36
2.39
.93
.85
1.46
3.80
2.62
2.52
1.60
2.41
b/
Null hypothesis—
No other—country
cause
(2)
X -statistic
1.31
1.52
1.18
1.73
1.68
.99
1.27
1.69
.99
1.78
.97
1.72
(T-k).ln T'ln e/S-
b) U
(lb)
(T-k)'lnllAJ T-lnll
(la) (2a) (2b)
B. Multivariate model
(13) YS, PS, IS 87. 9 (50.9)-^ 164.2 (50.9) 57.7 (58.6) 107.7 (58.6)
(14) YK, PK, IK 81. 3 (50.9) 151.7 (50.9) 68.2 (58.6)
127.3 (58.6)
(15) - (13) & (14) 161. 5 (84,4) 301.4 (84.4) 120.0(102,8)
224.0 (102.8)
(16) All 6 U.S.
dependent var. 123..2 (84.4) 230.0 (84.4) 110.2(102.8) 205.8 (102.8)
(17) All 6 U.K.
dependent var. 125 .3 (84.4) 233.8 (84.4) 116.3(102.8) 217.0
(102.8)
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TABLE 10.6 CONTINUED
a - Each unrestricted equation contains one and two year lagged values of the
12 different variables (24 regressors), a dummy variable (= 1 for pre-
Civil War years), and an intercept; the high-powered money variables are
excluded. All variables are expressed as percentage rates of change ex
cept for interest rates which are differences of levels. The FR and DC
variables were weighted by their respective shares of high-powered money,
b - Column (1): Each equation in the restricted model has 10 coefficients set
equal to zero, all lagged values of the domestic country's variables ex
cept lagged values of the dependent variable.
Column (2): Each equation in the restricted model has 12 coefficients set
equal to zero, all lagged values of the other country's variables.
c - Part A: The tests ignore potential contemporaneous cross-equation corre
lation of error terms. Part B: All tests are performed within a 12
equation system where cross-equation contemporaneous correlation of error
terms is taken into account. In column (1), rows (13)-(14) a total of 30
zero restrictions are imposed and rows (15)-(17) 60 zero restrictions are
imposed. In column (2), rows (13)-(14), a total of 36 zero restrictions
are imposed, and rows (15)-(17) 72 zero restrictions are imposed.
d - The critical F values at 5 and 1 percent significance levels for 10 and 30
degrees of freedom are 2.16 and 2.98, respectively, and for 12 and 36
degrees of freedom are 2.07 and 2.80, respectively.
e - Critical values at the 1 percent significance level are reported in
parentheses.
A Summary of Three Sets of Causality Tests In a Two Country Macro-
Economic Model: U.S.-U.K. 1837-1859, 1882-1914
Granger causing variable's
TABLE 10.7
variable YS ' PS FRS IS DSC NS YK PK FRK IK DCK NK
YS: weak _ N N Y N N N N Y N N N
strong 1 ~ N N N N N, N N N N N N
oiulticause fj
PS: weak N ® Y Y N N N N N N N
strong .(Nj - Y © Y • N, . N N N N N N
multlcause S
FRS: weak N N _ N N (n) N N N N N
strong . N N - N Y V, . N (n) © N N (n;
multlcause if S
IS: weak Y Y (N) Y N Y Y N N Y N
strong . N Y Y - N Y, . N N N N N N,
multlcause
DCS: weak N N N Y _ N N N Y N N N
strong . N N N N - . N N N N Y N.
multlcause N ft
NS: weak N M N N N N N N N N N
strong . N N N N N . N N EJ N N N,
multlcause Ej
YK: weak N (N) Y N N N Y N N N
strong . N N N N N, N N N N
multlcause ft iJ
PK: weak N Y N N N N ® _ Y N Y N
strong , Y Y N N N, . N - Y Y N,
multlcause Y
FRK: weak N N N N N N Y N _ N N N
strong . N N N N N . Y N - N N N,
multlcause N Y
IK: weak (n) Y n Y N N Y N N _ Y N
strong 1 N N Y (n) N N, ,® N N - Y N,
multlcause N r
DCK: weak N ti N N N (n) N "N N N _ N
strong . N N N N N N, . Y N N N - N,
multlcause N N
NK: weak N N N N N N Y N N N N
strong . N N Y (n) N N, . Y N Y N N
multlcause S
y = Yes reject the null hypothes is of no cause at the 5 percent s ignificance level;
N = No » fail to reject the null hypothesis of no cause;
®= Reject the nul 1 hypothesis of no cause at the 10 percent ;s ignificance leve 1
TABLE 10.8
Additional Tests of Granger Causality in a Two Country Macroeconomic Model,
U.S.-U.K. Gold Standard Period 1837-1859, 1882-1914®
Weak Tests^ Strong Tests^ Multiple Cause^
Dependent
Variable
Causing
Variable
F Causing
Variable
F
Own
Country ^
Variables
Other
Country
Variables
YS MS
HK
5,01
6.80
MS
HK
3.63
3.59
1.97 1.94
MS YS
YK
3.49
0.02
YS
YK
HK
0.35
1.47
4.27
1.03 2.24
YK HK
MS
4.32
1.69
HK
MS
3.30
4.02
1.91 1.71
HK YK
YS
1.62
0.10
YK
YS
MS
4.52
1.23
2.92
2.51 1.46
Degrees of
freedom
for column 2, 50 2, 34 8. 34 10, 34
Critical F at
5% level
10% level
3.19
2.42
3.29
2.47
2.23
1.86
2.12
1.80
a - All variables are expressed as percentage rates of change except
for interest rates which are differences of levels.
b - Each "unrestricted" model contains the one and two year lagged
values of the dependent variable and of the causing variable, a
dummy variable («1 for pre-Civil War years) and an intercept.
c - Each "unrestricted" model contains one and two year lagged values
of the 10 different variables (20 regressors), a dummy variable
(=1 for pre-Civil War years) and an intercept. No FR or DC
variable is included.
d - Excluding lagged values of the dependent variable.
9^^
^K.
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6 Appendix A
6.1 The Data
6.1.1 United States: Individual Series and Sources
High-Powered Money: The sum of notes and specie held by the banks and the
nonbank public. For 1833-59 from Rutner (1974) Table 28, col. 15 plus col.
19; 1879-1933 from Friedman and Schwartz (1982), Table 4.8, col. 9. Since
Rutner's data were reported for varying monthly bank statement dates, we took
appropriate weighted averages of the original data to arrive at figures
approximately centered on the end of June.
Money: The sum of currency (notes and specie) and commercial bank demand and
time deposits (held by the nonbank public). For 1833-59 from Rutner, Table
57, col. entitled "Calendar Year;" 1870-1933 from Friedman and Schwartz
(1982), Table 4.8, col. 1.
Specie; Specie held by banks and the nonbank public plus specie held by the
Treasury and, from 1914 on, the Federal Reserve. For 1833-59, from Rutner,
Table 28, col. 1, adjusted by us to a yearly (June-centered) average; 1879-
1914 from Friedman and Schwartz (1963) Tables 5 and 8; for the remaining years
from worksheets underlying Friedman and Schwartz (1963).
Real Income: For 1833-59 Smith and Cole index described below; 1870-1933,
real net national product from Friedman and Schwartz (1982), Table 4.8, col.
3.
Price Index: For 1833-59, a yearly GNP deflator derived from Gallman's
benchmark estimates; 1870-1933, an NNP deflator from Friedman and Schwartz
(1982), Table 4.8, col. 4.
Interest Rate: Commercial paper rates. For 1833-59, annual averages of
Bigelpw'i monthly series in Macaulay (1938, Appendix table 25); 1870-1933,
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from Friedman and Schwartz, table A.8, col. 6.
Population: For 1833-59, linear interpolations of census year decennial
estimates from Rutner, table 37; 1870-1933, Friedman and Schwartz (1982),
Table 4.8, col. 5.
6.1.2 United Kingdom: Individual Series and Sources
High-Powered Money; The sum of notes and coin held by the public plus bankers
deposits and other private deposits at the Bank of England, 1833-70 from
Huffman and Lothian (1980); 1871-1933 from Friedman and Schwartz (1982), table
4.9, col. 9.
Money: The sum of currency held by the public and total deposit (current
accounts and deposit accounts) at commercial banks. 1871-1933 from Friedman
and Schwartz (1982), Table 4.9, col. 1.
Specie: The sum of specie held by the public and specie held by the Bank of
England. Specie held by the public for 1833-70 from Huffman and Lothian
(1980); thereafter from unpublished worksheets underlying the data reported in
Friedman and Schwartz (1982), Table 4.9. Specie held by the Bank for 1833-
1879 from an unpublished appendix, "Bank of England liabilities and assets:
1696 to 1966," col. entitled "Assets. Coin and Bullion," to the article with
that title in the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, June 1967, pp. 159-63;
thereafter from Sheppard (1971, table A 1.12, col. 15).
Real Income: Real GNP from Deane (1968) for 1833-1912; thereafter, series
derived by us from Feinstein (1972, table 7, col. 7) index of real GNP at
constant factor cost.
Price Index: Real GNP series described above divided by nominal GNP from
Deane (1968) for 1833-1912; thereafter, from Feinstein (1972, table 2, col,
10).
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Interest Rates: First-class three-month bills. For 1833-56, from Mitchell
and Deane (1962); 1857-67, ibid., three-month bank bills; 1868-1933 from
Friedman and Schwartz (1982), table 4.9, col. 6
Population: For 1833-67, Mitchell and Deane (1968, p. 8); 1868-1933, Friedman
and Schwartz (1982), table 4.9, col. 5.
6.2 Problems with the U.S. Output Data
As a measure of real output in the U.S. during the antebellum period, we
used an index derived from Smith and Cole's (1935) separate production indexes
for the years 1831-45 and 1843-62.
Both indexes are made up of two components, domestic trade (two-thirds
weight) and foreign trade (one-third weight). The domestic index for 1831-45
was derived from 11 component series, 8 of which were expressed in physical
units; the domestic index for 1843-62, from 10 component series, 6 of which
were in physical units. The foreign trade indexes were both nominal measures
based on the total of exports and imports in current prices in both periods.
None of our conclusions about cyclical movements, however, would have been
grossly different had we relied solely on the domestic indexes. We linked the
two production indexes on the basis of Ayres (1939) index of cyclical
fluctuations.
The Smith and Cole indexes as published are in the form of deviations
from trend. Logarithmic first differences of these indexes, therefore, over
state the decline in the nontrend adjusted series. The overstatement in
the case of a series that follows a constant semilogarithmic trend is the
intercept term in that trend equation.
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In spite of their deficiencies these indices appeared far preferable
to the alternative measure of output we examined, an annual real GNP
series derived from Robert Gallman's (1966) benchmark estimates. Inspection
of this series revealed almost no correspondence with the NBER reference
cycles—even during the 1839—43 contraction, which by all accounts, both
contemporary and subsequent, was unusually severe. Most of the physical
volume series for individual industries we examined, in contrast, did
esdiibit cyclical movements corresponding to the NBER pattern as also did
the Smith and Cole indexes. One reason for the lack of cyclical movement
in the Gallman series may be its omission of Inventories, usually one of
the most cyclically sensitive components of GNP.
6.3 Proxy Series for the U.K. Money Supply
Prior to 1870 the U.K. deposit data are incomplete. For a subset of
these years, though, we have a proxy series, total liabilities of private
and joint stock bank in England and Wales to the nonbank public that
Michael Collins (1981) has constructed. Movements in these data are
summarized in a note at the bottom of table 3.
We view these data as Indicators of the direction but not the
magnitude of movement of the overall money stock relative to that of
the monetary gold stock. The reason we regard it as suspect from the
latter standpoint is that Collins was unable to obtain complete bank
balance sheet data for the whole period. As an interpolator, he
used the number of bank offices. In periods of banking panic, when
there were substantial bank failures, his series may, therefore, be more
volatile than the true series.
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6.4 Appendix B -
Panics and Cyclical Contractions
Discussions of financial panics abound in the literature devoted to partic
ular periods in the economic history of each country. More general treatments
of financial panics, either from a primarily theoretical and primarily his*"
torical standpoint, however, are few and far between.
One group of modern studies that has dealt with the phenomenon of finan
cial panics in some depth are those of the U.S. monetary system in the early
1960s at the National Bureau: Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz's A Monetary
History of the United States (1963) and their related article "Money and
Business Cycles" (1963) and especially Phillip Cagan's Determinants and Effects
of Changes in the Stock of Money, 1875-1960 (1965). Charles Kindleberger's
Manias, Panics and Crashes (1978) is a more recent work devoted to the study of
such episodes in an explicitly international context.
One of Cagan's specific concerns was the interrelation of cycles in
monetary growth and business. In a subsection of that title in the summary
chapter of his study he concludes (p. 296);
This evidence points to an important independent role of monetary
factors in severe business contractions. The six largest declines in
money were associated with severe depressions, and severe depressions
have never occurred otherwise...Panics cannot be held solely respon
sible for the deep declines in both money and business. Two severe
contractions had no panic; in addition, some panics did not produce a
large drop in monetary growth, and the accompanying declines in
business did not become severe.
Kindleberger, though he does not refer to Cagan's study, apparently would
disagree with his assessment. In Kindleberger's framework, panics are the
natural culmination of the previous boom in which speculation and overtrading
are rife. An increase in the money supply may alleviate the effects of the
panic; but a decrease during the panic is not a necessary condition for a
severe cyclical downturn.
Cagan's conclusions about the effects of panics stem in large part from
the comparisons he makes between cycles that were severe and had no panics and
cycles that were not severe but had panics. Of four relevant episodes—two in
each category—he excludes two from consideration, ending up with one in each
category. Our sample extends farther bank in time than Cagan*s and covers the
United Kingdom as well as the United States, Hence, it offers additional
degrees of freedom with which we can assess the relative importance of panics
and monetary contractions as proximate causes of business contractions.
To that end table B1 classifies cyclical contractions in both countries
according to both degree of severity (severe versus mild) and existence of a
banking panic. We exclude cycles that occupy the cell mild, no panic. We
further classify each of the cycles that we include according to the degree of
monetary contraction.
As a starting point in dividing the cycles according to degree of
severity, we adopted Burns and Mitchell's classification of 1857, 1873, 1893,
1907, 1920, 1929 as severe cycles for both countries. For the United States we
then added 1837, 1839, 1847, and 1882; and for the" United Kingdom, 1839 and
1883. We had some doubts about the degree of severity of 1837 and 1847 in the
United States and their two counterparts in the United Kingdom. On the basis
of output data in tables 2 and 3, we classified the two U.S. cycles as severe
and the corresponding U.K. cycles as mild. Following Burns and Mitchell we did
not include the 1913-14 contraction in the severe category. On the basis of
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the real output data alone, it clearly was severe. Had"we so classified it,
the case we make below would have been weakened but hardly overturned. More
over, as Cagan (p. 223) points out, the cycle is not very informative in any
event since the panic was a "rather mild affair."
By including both the period prior to 1875 in the United States and the
United Kingdom, we have thirteen additional severe cyclical contractions to
those Cagan examined, twelve accompanied by panics, one not and three addi
tional mild cyclical contractions, none accompanied by panics. As a glance at
the table indicates, the deciding factor in a cycle's severity is the existence
or absence of a monetary contraction rather than the existence or absence of a
panic. Panics took place in only ten of eighteen severe cycles; severe mone
tary contractions in fifteen. In three of the five mild cycles during which a
panic took place, the monetary contraction was also mild and in only one (1845
in the United Kingdom) was there an absolute decline in money.
The other aspect of these data that is of interest is the light they shed
on the question of transmission. In only three of the common cycles, 1836-38
(1837-38 in the United Kingdom), 1847-48 (1845-48 in the United Kingdom) and
1856-58 (1857-58 in the United Kingdom) were there panics in both countries.
In the first two, the fluctuations in output were a good deal more severe in
the United States than in the United Kingdom. The importance of panics as a
direct channel of transmission of cyclical fluctuations does not appear to have
been great. As an indirect channel, that is, through their effects on money
supplies, they appear to have exerted a more important influence.
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